

**CURRICULUM VITAE**  
**ADAM PAUTZ**

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Brown University  
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**EDUCATION**

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New York University  
Ph.D. Philosophy. 2004. Dissertation Title: *The Hard Core of the Mind-Body Problem*.  
Dissertation Supervisor: Ned Block.

The University of Minnesota  
B.A. in Psychology, B. A. in Philosophy. *Summa Cum Laude*. 1998.

**EMPLOYMENT**

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Full Professor, Department of Philosophy, Brown University. 2015-

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. 2012-2015.

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. 2004-2011.

Research Fellow, David Chalmers' Centre for Consciousness. Department of Philosophy, Australian National University. January-June 2012.

Postdoctoral Fellow, David Chalmers' Centre for Consciousness. Department of Philosophy, Australian National University. 2004-2005 and 2006-2007.

## AREAS

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Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics  
Areas of Competence: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

## PUBLICATIONS

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### Books

*Perception*. Routledge Press. 2021.

*“A superb book. The no-nonsense clarity, philosophical subtlety and thoroughness are reminiscent of authors like David Armstrong and David Lewis. I’m sure it will become a classic text in the literature on perception.”* - Geoffrey Lee, UC Berkeley

*“Adam Pautz’s Perception is the best general treatment of theories of perceptual experience that I’ve ever read. Each chapter is packed with fascinating arguments.”* – Jeff Speaks, Notre Dame.

*Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness*.  
Pautz and Stoljar (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2019.

*The Importance of Being Conscious*.  
Edited with Geoffrey Lee. Under contract with Oxford University Press.  
Contributors include David Chalmers, David Papineau, Kati Balog, Elizabeth Harman, John Hawthorne, and Uriah Kriegel.

### Articles

“Could the Quality of Experience Be Radically Indeterminate?”  
Forthcoming in *The Importance of Being Conscious*, eds. Lee and Pautz. Oxford University Press. In progress.

“A Look at French and Phillip’s Naïve Realism about Experience”  
Forthcoming in *New Wave Relationism*, eds. Ori Beck and Farid Masrour. Routledge. In progress.

“Consciousness First and Reductive Physicalism”  
Forthcoming in a special issue of *Synthese*. In progress.

“Perception and Illusion: Replies to Sethi, Speaks and Cutter”  
Forthcoming in *Inquiry*. In progress.

“The Nature of Perception: Replies to Frank Jackson, EJ Green, Craig French, Ian Phillips, and Heather Logue”. To be published online, *Brains Blog*. In progress.

“How to Achieve the Physicalist Dream? Identity vs. Grounding”  
In G. Rabin (ed.) *Grounding and Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Completed. In progress.

“Naïve Realism and the Science of Sensory Consciousness”  
Forthcoming in *Analytic Philosophy*. In progress.  
Runner up for the Sanders Philosophy of Mind Prize.

“Naïve Realism v Representationalism: An Argument from Science”  
A debate with Craig French & Ian Phillips and Susanna Schellenberg. In Cohen and McLaughlin (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind* (Wiley-Blackwell).  
In press.

“An Argument Against Papineau’s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience”  
*Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind*. In press.

“Varieties of Interpretationism about Belief and Desire”  
*Analysis*. 2021.

“Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory”  
*Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind*, volume 1. 2021.

“The Puzzle of the Laws of Appearance”  
*Philosophical Issues*. 2020.

“The Arrationality of Perception”  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. With a reply by Susanna Siegel. 2020.

“Representationalism about Consciousness”  
In U. Kriegel (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 2020.

“How Does Color Experience Represent the World?”  
In D. Brown and F. Macpherson (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour*. 2020.

“Consciousness and Coincidence”  
*Journal of Consciousness Studies*, with a reply by David Chalmers. 2020.

“What is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness?”  
*Journal of Consciousness Studies* 26: 188-215. 2019.

“Themes in Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness”  
Co-authored with Daniel Stoljar. In A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.) *Blockheads! Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2019.

“How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists.”  
In A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.) *Blockheads! Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2019.

Discussion of Anil Gupta’s “Outline of an Account of Experience”  
With Alex Byrne, Charles Goldhaber, Anil Gupta, and Raja Rosenhagen. *Analytic Philosophy* 59: 75-88. 2018

Discussion of Bill Brewer's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”,  
With Bill Brewer, David de Bruijn, Chris Hill, Raja Rosenhagen, Miloš Vuletić, and Wayne Wu. *Analytic Philosophy* 59: 19-32. 2018.

“The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness”  
*Philosophical Perspectives* 2017. Special Issue: Philosophy of Mind.

“The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds”  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 95: 470-477. 2017.  
With a reply by Jeff Speaks.

“Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument”  
In B. Nanay (ed.) *Current Debates in Philosophy of Perception*.  
Routledge, 23-42. 2017.

“Propositions and Properties”  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 93: 478-486. 2016.  
With a reply by Trenton Merricks.

“What is My Evidence that Here is a Cup?”  
*Philosophical Studies* 173: 915–927. 2016.

“The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism”  
In Kallestrup and Sprevak (eds.) *New Waves in Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 153-85.  
Palgrave. 2014.

“Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs?”  
*Philosophical Studies* 163: 25-36. 2013.

“The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists”  
In Brown (ed.) *Consciousness Inside and Out*, pp. 237-298. Springer. 2013.

“Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: Reply to Hilbert and Klein”  
In Brown (ed.) *Consciousness Inside and Out*, pp. 307-317. Springer. 2013.

“Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?”  
In Kriegel (ed.) *Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays*, pp. 194-234. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013.

“Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?”  
*Philosophical Issues* 21: 384-333. 2011.

“Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?”  
*Philosophical Issues* 20: 333-367. 2010.

“Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?”  
In B. Nanay (ed.) *Perceiving the World*, pp. 254-310. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.

“A Simple View of Consciousness”  
In G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds.) *The Waning of Materialism*, pp. 25-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.

“Philosophical Theories of Colour”  
In T. Bayne (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness*, pp. 144-149. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.

“What Are the Contents of Experiences?”  
*The Philosophical Quarterly* 59: 483-507. Published in 2009.  
Reprinted in MacPherson and Hawley (eds.) *The Admissible Contents of Experiences*:  
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

“An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics”  
*Philosophical Studies* 138: 335-347. 2008.

“The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality”  
*The Monist* 91: 250-272. 2008.

“Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence”  
*Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 495-541. 2007.

“Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument against Externalist Intentionalism”  
*Noûs* 40: 205-240. 2006. Reply by Byrne and Tye, “Qualia ain’t in the Head”.

“Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in terms of Colour Experience?”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83: 535-564. 2006.

“Byrne and Hilbert on the Unitary-Binary Structure of the Color”  
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 44-45. 2003.

“An Argument against Armstrong’s Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75: 109-111. 1997.

## Reviews

“Review of Williams, *The Metaphysics of Representation*.”  
*Mind*. 2021.

“Review of Mendelovici, *The Phenomenal and the Representational*”.  
*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. 2020.

“Review of Chirimuuta *Outside Color*”.  
*Philosophical Review* 127: 558-561. 2018.

“Review of Langsam’s *The Wonder of Consciousness*.”  
*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. 2014.

“Review of Hill’s *Consciousness*.”  
*Analysis* 71: 294-297. 2011.

“Review of Cohen’s *The Red and The Real*.”  
*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. 2010.

## PRESENTATIONS

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How to Achieve the Physicalist Dream: Identity vs Grounding  
Debate with Jonathan Schaffer. Canadian Philosophical Association. June 2023.

Online Symposium on my book *Perception*. Forthcoming in *Brains blog*. Comments  
from Frank Jackson, EJ Green, Craig French, Ian Phillips, and Heather Logue.

The Epistemic Significance of Consciousness  
Cornell Conference on Mind and Value, organized by Matt Duncan and Emad Atiq.  
August 2023.

The Epistemic Significance of Consciousness  
Conference of the Significance of Subjectivity. University of Liège on April 24-28,  
2023.

The Puzzle of the Laws of Appearance: Representationalism vs Naïve Realism.  
UC Santa Cruz Colloquium. November 2022.

Could the Quality of Experience Be Radically Indeterminate?  
Guest Lecture at Geoff Lee's seminar. University of California, Berkeley. November 2022.

The Epistemic Value of Consciousness and Reductive Physicalism  
Guest Lecture at Brian McLaughlin's seminar. Rutgers University. Spring 2022.

Comments on Brie Gertler. Conference on Acquaintance and Value. Cornell University. May 13-15, 2022.

Replies to Cutter, Sethi, Speaks. Author Meets Critics on my book *Perception*.  
APA Eastern. January 2022.

Q&A of my book *Perception*.  
Washington University, St. Louis. Fall 2021.

How to Achieve the Physicalist Dream? Identity vs Grounding.  
Reductionism in meta-ethics and the philosophy of mind. Oxford University. July 2021.

The Epistemic Value of Consciousness: A Problem for Reductive Physicalism.  
Workshop on the Moral Significance of Consciousness. Notre Dame. May 2021.

Does Science Undermine Some Forms of Naïve Realism?  
*New Waves in Relationism* Conference. Madison, Wisconsin. May 2021.

Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory: A Multistage Account  
NYU Mind and Language Seminar. Spring 2021.

The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness.  
Oxford Metaphysics of Consciousness Seminar. Spring 2021.

The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness.  
Ohio State, colloquium presentation. Spring 2021.

The Laws of Appearance: Representationalism vs Naïve Realism.  
Workshop with the Oxford Group, *Perceiving Properties*. December 2020.

Discussion of my book *\*Perception\**.  
Neil Mehta Philosophy of Perception Workshop. Summer 2020

Comments on *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*.  
2020 SSPP.

Comments on Williams, *The Metaphysics of Representation*.  
Central APA 2020.

The Puzzle of the Laws of Appearance.  
New England Conference on Experience and the Physical World. Fall 2019.

The Representational Character of Experience.  
Guest presentation at Ned Block's NYU seminar, Fall 2019.

What do philosophers disagree about when they disagree about toad representation?  
Comments on John Morrision. Pacific Meeting of American Philosophical Association,  
April 17-21, 2019.

Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory.  
Presentation at Carla Merino-Rajme seminar on Consciousness and Intentionality at  
the University of North Carolina, April, 2019.

The Puzzle of the Laws of Appearance.  
Invited speaker, annual SSPP meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 6-10, 2019.

Comments on Brian Cutter "The Experience of Left and Right".  
Annual SSPP meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 6-10, 2019.

The Representational Limits of Perception and Perceptual Belief.  
Guest presentation at E. J Green and Alex Byrne's seminar Perception and Concepts  
at MIT, March 2019.

The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness.  
Colloquium. University of Toronto. October, 2018.

Are Qualia in the World or in the Head? Colloquium.  
York University in Toronto. October, 2018.

Phenomenal Indeterminacy and Graded Perceptual Justification.  
Guest presentation at Susanna Siegel's graduate seminar, Harvard University, April,  
2018.

Comments on "The Metaphysical Cosmic Coincidence Problem for Metanormative  
Non-Naturalism".  
Philosophy Mountain Workshop, Telluride, CO. March 2-4. 2018.

Comments on Siegel, Author Meets Critics, *The Rationality of Perception*.



Eastern APA. January, 2018.

A Dilemma for Russellian Monism about Consciousness.  
Conference on Russellian Monism: Time for the Details. Central European University,  
Budapest, Hungary. 2017

Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?  
Institut Jean Nicod. Workshop organized by Uriah Kriegel and John Morrison

Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?  
Cambridge New Directions Project. Summer 2017

Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?  
Leeds. Summer 2017.

Being Present to the Mind: A New Case for the Irreducibility of Consciousness  
Leeds. Summer 2017.

How Does Color Experience Represent the World?  
Leeds. Summer 2017.

Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?  
Conference on sensible qualities. UC Berkeley. Spring 2017.

Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?  
Conference on color primitivism, organized by Derek Brown, Spring 2017.

Comments on Speaks, *The Phenomenal and the Representational*.  
Central APA, 2017

Are Sensory Qualities in the Head or In the World?  
Presentation at Perception and Action talks series. Brown University. 2017

Are Sensory Qualities in the Head or In the World?  
Presentation at Brown Institute for Brain Science. 2016

Comments on Anil Gupta.  
Conference on Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason. University of Pittsburgh.  
October 21, 2016.

Discussion of my book MS, *Perception*.  
Columbia University. 2016.

A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness  
Yale University Colloquium. 2016.

A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness  
2016 Cambridge New Directions Project

A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness  
2016 CUNY Colloquium.

A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness  
2016 Southern Methodist University Colloquium.

A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness  
2016 Metaphysics at the Ranch

Are Colors out There? Comments on Chirimuuta's *Outside Color*  
2016 Pacific APA

Does Science Support Internalism about Experience?  
2015 Pacific APA. Invited Paper, with Geoff Lee and Casey O'Callaghan as  
commenters

The Mind-Body Problem for Intentionalists: Some Empirical Puzzles  
Spring 2015, Michigan

What is Inquiry? Comments on Jane Friedman  
2015 Metaphysics at the Ranch

The Price of Internalism about Experience  
Fall 2014. Brown, Philosophy Department Colloquium Series

The Price of Internalism about Experience  
Fall 2014. University of Southern California, Philosophy Department Colloquium  
Series

The Puzzle of Personites: Comments on Mark Johnston  
2014 Pacific APA

The Content View vs. the Object View of Experience  
Author Meets Critics, 2014 Central APA

Consciousness as the Source of Rationality and Thought  
Rice, Conference on Perception and Thought, 2013

Could Consciousness be a Brain Process?  
Jowett Society Oxford, 2013

Does the Rich Content View of Experience Matter?  
Pacific APA 2013

What is My Evidence that Here is a White Cup?  
Central APA 2013

Phenomenal Externalism  
Australian National University. Seminar. 2012.

Is Consciousness Just in the Head?  
The University of Western Australia. Consciousness Conference. 2012.

Epistemic Troubles for Naïve Realists  
The Australian National University. Mind and Epistemology Conference. 2012.

Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs?  
Seattle, Washington. Invited commentary on Disjunctivism about Experience. Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. 2012.

Could Consciousness Just be a Brain Process?  
University of California at Berkeley. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2011.

Against Phenomenal Externalism.  
Columbia University. Perception Conference. 2011.

Experiencing *Abstracta*?  
University of Texas at Austin. Graduate Student Conference. 2011.

The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: The Science of Pain, Taste and Smell.  
Consciousness Online Conference III. 2011.

How Do Sensible Properties Become Present to the Mind?  
University of California at San Diego. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series.  
2011.

Retentionalist vs Extensionalist Theories of Time Consciousness.  
Harvard University. Time Consciousness Conference. 2010.

Is Experience Predicational?  
New York University. Conference on the Predicational Structure of Experience. 2010.

How Do Sensible Properties Become Present to the Mind?  
Rutgers University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2010.

Disjunctivism and Knowledge of Color.

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Conference on Color Perception and Color Language. 2010.

Epistemological Arguments Against Disjunctivism.  
Columbia University. New Directions in the Philosophy of Perception. 2010.

Why Consciousness Can't Just be in the Head.  
Cornell University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2010

Why Consciousness Can't Just be in the Head.  
Consciousness Online Conference II. 2010.

Tastes, Pains, and Sounds: New Problems for Naturalizing Consciousness.  
Lund University, Sweden. Filosofidagarna (Sweden's National Philosophy Conference). 2009.

Yuck and Yum: New Puzzles for Intentionalism.  
The University of Texas at Austin. *The Waning of Materialism* Workshop. 2009.

The Content of Color Experience and the Light View of Color.  
The University of Texas at Austin. UTexas/UNAM Conference. 2008.

An Argument for the Intentional View of Experience.  
Syracuse University. Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network. 2008.

An Argument for the Intentional View of Experience.  
Umea University, Sweden. Lecture to the Philosophy Department. 2008.

Is the External World Colored?  
Umea University, Sweden. Lecture to the Philosophy Department. 2008.

What are Colors?  
Umea University, Sweden. Public Lecture. 2008.

An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Experience.  
The University of Texas at Austin. Understanding and Illusion Workshop. 2008.

The Case for Intentionalism about Sensory Consciousness.  
Merida, Mexico. UTexas/UNAM Conference. 2007.

The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality.  
The Australian National University. Phenomenology and Intentionality Workshop Conference. 2007.

Intentionalism and the Admissible Contents of Experience.

The University of Glasgow. Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience. 2007.

The Intentional View of Sensory Consciousness.  
Kioloa Australia Conference on Consciousness. 2007.

Why Believe that Experiences have Contents?  
The University of Western Australia. Consciousness and Representation Conference. 2007.

Intentionalism and Non-Visual Modalities.  
Kioloa Australia Conference on Consciousness. 2006.

Can Intentionalists be Reductionists?  
Canberra, Australia. Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. 2006.

Can Intentionalists be Reductionists?  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.

Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions: A Reply to Byrne and Tye.  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.

Modesty versus Immodesty about the Role of Introspection in the Philosophy of Perception: Comments on Hellie.  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.

Intentionalism and the Laws of Appearance.  
New York, NY. Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Society. 2006.

Does Intentionalism Really Accommodate the Transparency Observation?  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.

A Critique of Realist Primitivism about the Colors.  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.

Can Colour Structure be Explained in terms of Colour Experience?  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.

The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.  
Australian National University. Inaugural Lecture for the Centre for Consciousness. 2004.

The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.

The University of Texas at Austin, The University of Michigan, The University of Colorado at Boulder, The University of Arizona, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst, The University of Iowa. 2003.

The Mind-Body Problem for Intentionalists.  
Linkoping, Sweden. Filosofidagarna (Sweden's National Philosophy Conference).  
2003.

Representationalism and Phenomenal-Neural Dependence.  
Tufts University. New England Undergraduate Conference. 1998.