

**Christopher S. Hill**  
**Curriculum Vitae**  
**January, 2023**

**1. Position and Academic Department**

Professor of Philosophy  
Department of Philosophy  
Brown University

**2. Home Address**

26 Poplar Ave.  
East Providence, RI 02915

**3. Education**

- a. Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1972, Harvard University
- b. B.A., M.A., 1966, Michigan State University

**4. Professional Appointments**

- a. Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow,  
University of Pittsburgh, 1972-1974
- b. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, 1974-1981
- c. Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arkansas, 1981-1988
- d. Professor of Philosophy, University of Arkansas, 1988 – June, 2002
- e. Editor, *Philosophical Topics*, 1984-2004
- f. Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Fall 1991 and Spring  
1993
- g. Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, 1997-8
- h. Professor of Philosophy, Brown University, July 2002 – June 2014
- i. Visiting Professor of Philosophy, MIT, Fall, 2003
- j. Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Fall, 2012

k. William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy, Brown University,  
July 2014 --present

## 5. Books

*Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism* (Cambridge University Press, 1991)

*Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence* (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

*Consciousness* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Portugese Translation  
*Consciência* (Sao Paulo: Fundacao Editoria da UNESP, 2010)]

*Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 2014)

*Perceptual Experience* (Oxford University Press, 2022)

## 6. Edited Books

*New Perspectives on Type Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), co-edited  
with Simone Gozzano

*Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness* (MIT Press, 2014), co-edited with  
David Bennett.

*New Directions in the Philosophy of Perception*, co-edited with Brian McLaughlin,  
Volume 44, issue 2, *Philosophical Topics* (University of Arkansas Press, 2017)

## 7. Book Chapters

“Intentionality, Folk Psychology, and Reduction,” in Herbert Otto (ed.), *Perspectives on Mind* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), 169-179

“Ouch! An Essay on Pain,” in Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), *Higher Order Theories of Consciousness* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), 339-362

“Ow! The Paradox of Pain,” Murat Aydede (ed.), *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75-98

“Perceptual Consciousness: How it Opens Directly onto the World, Preferring the World to the Mind,” in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds.), *Consciousness and Self-Reference* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 249-72

“Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness,” in Shaun Nichols (ed.), *The Architecture of the Imagination* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 205-235

- “The Identity Theory,” in Timothy Bayne (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Consciousness* (Oxford University Press, 2009)
- “Locating Qualia: Are They in the Mind or in the Body and the World?” in Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill (eds.), *New Perspectives on Type Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
- “Introduction” to *New Perspectives on Type-Identity*, co-authored with Simone Gozzano
- “Concepts, Teleology, and Rational Revision,” in Albert Casullo (ed.), *The A Priori in Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 2013)
- “A Unity Pluralist Account of the Unity of Experience,” co-authored with David Bennett in Christopher S. Hill and David J. Bennett (eds.), *Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness* (MIT Press, 2014)
- “Visual Awareness and Visual Consciousness,” in Marcelo Sebatos and David Sosa (eds.), *Essays in Honor of Jaegwon Kim* (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
- “Goldman on Knowledge of Mind” H. Kornblith and B. McLaughlin (eds.), *Goldman and His Critics* (Wiley, 2016)
- “Conceivability and Possibility,” in H. Cappelan, T. Gendler, and J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology* (Oxford, 2016)
- “Fault Lines in Familiar Concepts of Pain,” in J. Corns (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain* (Routledge, 2017)
- “Perceptual Relativity,” *New Directions in the Philosophy of Perception*, co-edited with Brian McLaughlin (University of Arkansas Press, 2017)
- “Mind, Identity Theory of,” in Thomas Polger (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Routledge, 2019) DOI 10.4324/9780415249126-V016-2
- “Consciousness and Memory,” in U. Kriegel (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Consciousness* (Oxford, 2020)
- “What Is a Concept?,” in Luis Oliveira and Kevin Corcoran (eds.), *Common Sense Metaphysics* (Routledge, 2020)
- “A Substitutional Theory of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence,” in Michael P. Lynch, Junyeol Kim, and Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), *The Nature of Truth: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives* (MIT Press, 2021)

“Perceptual Awareness of Objects,” in Jonathan Cohen and Brian McLaughlin (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind* (in press, Blackwell)

"Comment on Christopher Peacocke's 'Two Kinds of Explanation and Their Significance'," in Ori Beck (ed.) *Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason* (in press, University of Pittsburgh Press).

## 8. Papers in Refereed Journals

“‘gavagai,’” *Analysis* XXXII (1972), 68-75

“Toward a Theory of Meaning for Belief Sentences,” *Philosophical Studies* XXX (1976), 209-226

“Of Bats, Brains, and Minds,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XXXVIII (1977), 100-106

“Why Cartesian Intuitions are Compatible with the Identity Thesis,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XLII (1981), 254-65

“On a Revised Version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* LXIII (1982), 236-42

“In Defense of Type Materialism,” *Synthese* LIX (1984), 295-320

“Watsonian Freedom and Freedom of the Will,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* LXII (1984), 294-298

“Animadversions on the Inscrutability Thesis,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 65 (1984), 303-312

“Desert and the Moral Arbitrariness of the Natural Lottery,” *The Philosophical Forum*, XVI (1985), 207-222

“Rudiments of a Theory of Reference,” *The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 28 (1987), 200-219

“Introspective Awareness of Sensations,” *Topoi*, 7 (1988), 11-24

“van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument,” *Analysis*, 52 (1992), 49-55

“Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism, and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 16 (1993), 50-51

“Two Cheers for Process Reliabilism,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 75 (1994), 12- 28

- “Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LV1 (1996), 567-581 (Reprinted in Keith de Rose and Ted Warfield (eds.), *Skepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999))
- “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem,” *Philosophical Studies* 87 (1997), 61-85 (Reprinted in David J. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002))
- “Chalmers on the A Priority of Modal Knowledge,” *Analysis* 58 (1998), 20-26
- “Peacocke on Semantic Values,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76 (1998), 97-104
- “There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy,” co-authored with Brian McLaughlin, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LIX (1999), 445-454
- “Truth in the Realm of Thoughts,” *Philosophical Studies* 96 (1999), 87-121
- “From Assertion to Belief: The Role of Linguistic Data in the Practice of Belief-ascription,” *Protosociology* 14 (2000), 56-66.
- “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Reconciling Deflationary Semantics with Correspondence Intuitions,” *Philosophical Studies* 104 (2001), 291-321
- “Remarks on David Papineau’s *Thinking about Consciousness*,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LXXI (2005), 147-54
- “Precis of *Thought and World*,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LXXII (2006), 174-181
- “Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith Simmons,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LXXII (2006), 205-222
- “I Love Machery’s Book, but Love Concepts More,” *Philosophical Studies* 149 (2010), 411-421
- “How to Study Introspection” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 18 (2011), 21-42.
- “Can Carey Answer Quine?” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*. 34 (2011), 132-133).
- “Précis of *Consciousness*” and “Reply to Byrne and Dretske,” *Philosophical Studies* 161 (2011), 483-487 and 503-511

- “Tim Bayne on the Unity of Consciousness,” *Analysis* (2014) 74 (3): 499-509
- “Précis of *Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge*,” and “Replies to Byrne, McGrath, and McLaughlin,” *Philosophical Studies* 173 (2016): 827-829 and 861-872.
- “Deflationism: The Best Thing Since Pizza and Quite Possibly Better,” *Philosophical Studies* 173 (2016): 3170-3180
- “Insects: Still Looking Like Zombies,” *Animal Sentience* 1 (2016): 1-4
- “Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s *Modality and Explanatory Reasoning*,” co-authored with Nina Emery, *Analysis* 77 (1) (2017): 134-148
- “Adrienne Prettyman on Perceptual Precision,” and “Reply to Adrienne Prettyman,” *2017 Minds Online Conference*, <http://mindsonline.philosophyofbrains.com/>
- “Reid and Van Cleve on Perception and Knowledge,” *Analytic Philosophy* 59 (4) (2017): 515–526
- “Comment on Bill Brewer’s ‘Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason’,” *Analytic Philosophy* 59 (1) (2018): 4-5
- “Unity of Consciousness,” *WIRE Cognitive Science* 9 (5) (2018): DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1465
- “Perceptual Existentialism Sustained,” *Erkenntnis*. Online version (2019): <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00160-z>
- “Appearance and Reality,” *Philosophical Issues* 30 (2020): 175-191.
- “Unrevisability,” *Synthese* 198 (2021): 3015–3031.
- “A Tribute to Karen Neander, co-authored with Carlotta Pavese, *Biological Theory* (2021) <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-021-00383-w>
- “Schellenberg on Perception,” *Mind and Language*, vol. 37 (2021): 208-2
- “Gupta Has Built a Mighty Mansion, But Can We Live in It?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 104 (2021) 236-242.
- “Neander on a Mark of the Mental,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 105 (2022): 484-449.
- “Armchair Methods in the Philosophy of Mind,” *Protosociology*, accepted for

publication

## 9. Papers in Non-Refereed Journals

“Self Referential Thoughts,” *Philosophical Issues*, 16 (2006), 346-57

“Hawthorne on the Lottery Problem and the Nature of Belief” (co-authored with Joshua Schechter), *Philosophical Issues*, 17 (2007): 103-122

“The Perception of Size and Shape” (co-authored with David Bennett), *Philosophical Issues* 18 (2008), 294-315

“Intentionality Downsized,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 20 (2010), 144-169.

“Block on Cognition,” Blog on Ned Block’s *Seeing and Thinking*.

## 10. Reviews

Review of David Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, co-authored with L.G. Creary, *Philosophy of Science* XLIII, 341-344

Review of George Nakhnikian (ed.), *Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy*, *The Philosophical Review* LXXXV (1976), 426-429

Review of Ernest W. Adams, *The Logic of Conditionals*, co-authored with Ian Carlstrom, *Philosophy of Science* XLV (1978), 155-158

Review of Kenneth M. Sayre, *Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind*, *The Philosophical Review* LXXXVII (1978), 494-497

Review of Stephen N. Thomas, *The Formal Mechanics of Mind*, *The Philosophical Review* LXXXVIII (1979), 648-651

Review of Robert W. Shahan and Chris Swoyer (eds.), *Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine*, *Philosophical Topics* XII (1981), 267-73

Review of Merrie Bergmann, James Moor, and Jack Nelson, *The Logic Book*, *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* VIIIIL (1982), 915-917

Review of Judson C. Webb, *Mechanism, Mentalism, and Metamathematics*, *The Philosophical Review* XCII (1983), 276-79

Review of R.J. Nelson, *The Logic of Mind*, *The Philosophical Review* XCIII (1984), 626-630

Review of Christopher Peacocke, *Thoughts*, *Ethics* 97 (1987), 890-891

- Review of Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, *The Philosophical Review* XCVII (1988), 573-579
- Review of Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), *Subject, Thought, and Context*, *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXXVII (1990), 106-112
- Review of Alan Millar, *Reasons and Experience*, *The Philosophical Review*, CII (1993), 279-281
- Critical Notice of William Seager, *The Metaphysics of Consciousness*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 24 (1991), 155-168
- Review of John Heil, *The Nature of True Minds*, *The Philosophical Review* 103 (1994), 721-723
- Review of Robert Kirk, *Raw Feelings*, *Philosophical Books*, 37 (1996), 127-130
- Critical Notice of Lynne Baker, *Explaining Attitudes*, *Nous*, 31 (1997), 132-142
- Review of Mark Rowlands, *Supervenience and Materialism*, *Philosophical Review* 107 (1998), 115-117
- Review of Norton Nelkin, *Consciousness and the Origins of Thought*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LIX (1999), 273-76
- Review of Colin McGinn, *The Mysterious Flame*, *The Philosophical Review* 110 (2001), 300-303
- Review of Joseph Levine, *Purple Haze*, *Mind* 111 (2002), 882-888
- Review of Scott Sturgeon, *Matters of Mind*, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 53 (2003), 123-126
- Review of Zenon Pylyshyn, *Things and Places*, *Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews* 2007 (<http://ndpr.nd.edu>)
- Critical Notice of Sanford Goldberg, *Anti-Individualism*, *Philosophical Books* 50 (2009), 112-123
- Review of Peter Hylton, *Quine*, *Philosophical Review* 120 (2011), 117-123
- Review of Paul Horwich, *Truth – Meaning – Reality*, *Mind* 120 (2011), 1262-1270.
- Review of Derk Pereboom, *Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism*, *The Philosophical Review*, 122 (2013), 511-518



Critical Notice of Allan Gibbard, *Meaning and Normativity*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (<http://ndpr.nd.edu>)

Review of István Aranyosi, *The Peripheral Mind*, *Mind* 124 (2015): 312-317

Review of Francesco Berto and Mark Jago, *Impossible Worlds*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (2020) (<https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/impossible-worlds>)

Review of Anil Gupta, *Conscious Experience*, forthcoming

## **10. Honors, Awards, and Fellowships**

Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh, September 1973 through July 1974

Recipient of the Carl Wittke Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, Case Western Reserve University, 1979

Postdoctoral Fellow at the N.E.H. Institute on Psychology and Philosophy of Mind, June 1981 through July 1981

N.E.H. Summer Stipend Fellow, June 1983 through July 1983

Fellow at the N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Self-Reference and Self-Identity, June 1985 through August 1985

Fellow at the National Humanities Center, September 1987 through June 1988

Fellow at the N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Philosophy of Mathematics, June 1988 through August 1988

Fellow at the N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Mental Representation, June 1991 through August 1991

N.E.H. Summer Stipend Fellow, June 1993 through July 1993

Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Spring 1996

Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, September 1997 through May, 1998

Fellow at the N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Simulation and the Theory-theory, June 1999 through July 1999

Visiting Fellow at the Center for Consciousness, Australasian National University,

August 2006

Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March and  
April, 2007

William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy, Brown University