

CURRICULUM VITAE

David Christensen

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EDUCATION:

B.A. in Philosophy	Hampshire College, 1978
Ph.D. in Philosophy	University of California, Los Angeles, 1987

EMPLOYMENT:

1987 - 1993	Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Vermont
1993 - 1998	Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Vermont
1993 - 1994	Interim Chair of Philosophy Department, University of Vermont
1998 - 2007	Professor of Philosophy, University of Vermont
Fall 2005	Interim Chair of Philosophy Department, University of Vermont
2007 -	Professor of Philosophy, Brown University
2018 – 2021	Royce Family Professor of Teaching Excellence, Brown University

AREA OF SPECIALIZATION:

Epistemology (former AOS: Philosophy of Science)

PUBLICATIONS:

BOOKS:

The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, edited with Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press (2013)

- Paperback edition (OUP), (2016)

Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief, Oxford University Press (2004)

- Paperback edition (OUP), (2007).

ARTICLES:

- “Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required,” *Noûs*, Online first (November 2022): 1-22.
doi: 10.1111/nous.12441.
- “Rationality for the Self-Aware,” Ernest Sosa Prize Lecture, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 95 (2021): 191–212.
- “Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas,” in K. McCain, S. Stapleford, and M. Steup, eds., *Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles* (Routledge 2021).
- “Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty,” *Philosophical Studies* 178 (2021): 2191–2214.
- “The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 103 (3) (2021): 501-517.
- “Formulating Independence,” in Skipper, M. and A. Steglich-Petersen, eds., *Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays* (Oxford University Press, 2019).
- “On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case,” Marc Sanders Lecture, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 92 (2018): 207-235.
- “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia,” *Episteme* (2016): 397-422.
- “Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” *Noûs* 50, 3 (2014): 584-603.
- “Disagreement and Public Controversy,” in Jennifer Lackey, ed., *Essays in Collective Epistemology*, Oxford University Press (2014).
- “Epistemic Modesty Defended,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds., *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays*, Oxford University Press (2013): 77-97.
- “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* (2011): 1-22.
- “Rational Reflection,” *Philosophical Perspectives: Epistemology* (2010): 121-140.
- “Higher-Order Evidence,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 81.1 (2010): 185-215.
- “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” *Philosophy Compass* 4 (2009): 1 – 12.

- “Epistemic Self-Respect,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 107 (2007): 319 - 337.
- “Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals,” *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* 2 (2007): 3 - 31.
- “Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News,” *Philosophical Review* 116 (2007): 187 - 217.
- reprinted in J. Fantl, et. al., eds, *Contemporary Epistemology* (Wiley Blackwell 2019).
- “Three Questions about Leplin’s Reliabilism,” *Philosophical Studies* 134 (2007): 43 - 50.
- “Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism,” *Philosophy of Science* 68 (2001): 356 - 376.
- “Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality,” *Philosophical Review* 109 (2000): 349 - 371.
- “Measuring Confirmation,” *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (1999): 437 - 461.
- “What is Relative Confirmation?” *Noûs* 31 (1997): 370 - 385.
- (with Hilary Kornblith) “Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the *A Priori*,” *Philosophical Studies* 86 (1997): 1 - 20.
- “Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers,” *Journal of Philosophy* 93 (1996): 450 - 479.
- “Conservatism in Epistemology,” *Noûs* 28 (1994): 69 - 89.
- “Switched-Words Skepticism: a Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument,” *Philosophical Studies* 71 (1993): 33 - 58.
- “Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53 (1993): 301 - 321.
- “Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology,” *Philosophy of Science* 59 (1992): 540-557.
- “Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections,” *Analysis* 52 (1992) :163-168.
- “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs,” *Philosophical Review* 100 (1991): 229-247.
- “The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping,” *Philosophy of Science* 57 (1990): 644-662.

- reprinted in L. Sklar, ed., *The Philosophy of Science* (New York: Garland, 1999).

“Glymour on Evidential Relevance,” *Philosophy of Science* 50 (1983): 471-481.

- reprinted in L. Sklar, ed., *The Philosophy of Science* (New York: Garland, 1999).

CRITICAL STUDY:

“Robert Nozick, *The Nature of Rationality*,” *Noûs* 29 (1995): 259 - 274.

REVIEWS:

Review of *Bayes or Bust?* by John Earman, *Philosophical Review* 103 (1994): 345-347.

Review of *The Rationality of Science* by W. H. Newton-Smith, *Philosophical Review* 93 (1984): 471-474.

MISCELLANEOUS:

“Reflection on ‘Splitting the Bill at a Restaurant’ in Helen De Cruz, ed., *Philosophy Illustrated* (Oxford University Press, 2022).

“Disagreement,” *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2013).

PRESENTATIONS:

“No-Fault Epistemic Akrasia,” University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, October 2022.

“Epistemic Akrasia: No apology required,” University of St. Andrews (Scotland), April 2022 (delivered remotely).

“Disrespecting the Evidence?” Evidentialism Conference, University of Rochester, April 2022.

“Rationality for the Self-Aware,” inaugural Ernest Sosa Prize Lecture, APA Eastern Division, January 2021 (delivered remotely).

“Acratic (Epistemic) Modesty,” Chapel Hill Colloquium, UNC-Chapel Hill, October 2020. [canceled due to coronavirus]

“In Defense of Epistemic Dilemmas,” Workshop on Epistemic Dilemmas, St. Thomas University, New Brunswick, Canada, June 2020. [canceled due to coronavirus]

- “Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty,” NYU, March 2020. [canceled due to coronavirus]
- “Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty,” Harvard Workshop on Bounded Rationality, October 2019.
- “Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty,” National University of Singapore, August 2019 [canceled due to illness]
- “Independence, Conciliation, and the Problem of Political Passions,” Bled Epistemology Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 2019.
- “Formulating Independence, and the Problem of Political Passions,” Conference on Social and Political Epistemology, University of Copenhagen, March 2018.
- “On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case,” Marc Sanders Lecture, American Philosophical Association, January 2018.
- “On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case,” New York University, November 2017.
- “Preserving Independence,” University of Cologne, Germany, October 2017.
- “Preserving Independence,” University of Barcelona, Spain, September 2017 (delivered by Miriam Schoenfield due to my illness).
- “The Importance of Independence,” University of Texas, Austin, March 2017.
- “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” LOGOS Workshop on Fallibility, Rational Belief and Knowledge, Barcelona, May 2016.
- “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” University of Vermont, (conference honoring Arthur Kuflik), May 2016.
- “Why You Should Not Believe the Conclusion of this Talk,” Keynote lecture, Phi Sigma Tau philosophy honor society, Providence College, April 2016.
- “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” Union College, February 2016
- “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” University of Copenhagen, November 2015.
- “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” University of Rochester, October 2015.

“Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” Simon Fraser University, September 2015.

“Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” *Episteme* Epistemology Conference, Phuket, Thailand, June 2015.

“Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” Northwestern University, May 2015.

“Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” Mini-Conference on Rational Belief and Higher-Order Evidence, Brandeis University, March 2015.

Keynote address, “From Disagreement to Drugs: Rational Requirements on Irrational Agents,” Midwest Epistemology Workshop, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, October 2014.

“From Disagreement to Drugs: Norms from Logic and Higher-Order Evidence,” Center for Advanced Studies, Ludwig Maximilians-Universität, Munich, Germany, September 2014.

Comments on Fitelson’s *Coherence*, Duke University, May 2014.

“Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” Chambers Philosophy Conference, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, May 2014.

“Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” LOGOS Colloquium at University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, October 2013.

“Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” Social Epistemology Workshop, ARCHÉ Research Centre, St. Andrews, Scotland, October 2013.

“Epistemic Modesty Defended,” Yale University, February 2013.

“Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” APA Central Division, February, 2013

“Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” Bled Epistemology Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 2013.

“Epistemic Modesty Defended,” University of Wisconsin, Madison, November 2012.

“Disagreement and Public Controversy,” Conference on Epistemology of Groups, Northwestern University, June 2012.

“Epistemic Modesty Defended,” Formal Epistemology Workshop, Munich, May 2012

“Epistemic Modesty Defended,” Ohio State University, March 2012

- “Epistemic Modesty Defended,” Oxford University, February 2012
- “Epistemic Modesty Defended,” Collège de France, Conference on “L’*épistémologie* du Désaccord,” June 2011.
- “Problems with Moral Expertise: Epistemic or Practical?” (comments on Sarah McGrath’s “Moral Expertise, Metaethics, and Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong”), Princeton/Brown Workshop on Moral Expertise, April 2011.
- “Rational Reflection,” University of Arizona, April 2011.
- “Disagreement and Political Controversy,” Brandeis Graduate Student Brown Bag series, February 2011.
- “The Epistemology of Political Controversy,” Plenary session, Second Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology, Copenhagen, Denmark, August 2010.
- “Rational Reflection,” Formal Epistemology Conference, Stirling, Scotland, May 2010.
- “Rational Reflection,” Brazil Epistemology Conference, Porto Alegre, Brazil, June 2010.
- “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,” Keynote address, Alabama Philosophical Society Conference, October 2009.
- “Higher-Order Evidence,” Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 2009.
- “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,” MIT, April 2009
- “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,” University of Toronto, November 2008.
- “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,” University of Pennsylvania, October 2008.
- “Why You Should Not Believe the Conclusion of this Talk,” Brandeis College, September 2008.
- “Why You Should Not Believe the Conclusion of this Talk,” Swarthmore College, November 2007.
- “Epistemic Self-Respect,” The Aristotelian Society, London, June 2007.
- “Disagreement” and “Murphy’s Law”, NYU Mind and Language Seminar, NYU, March 2007.

- Comment on Elga's "Disagreement and Bootstrapping," American Philosophical Association Eastern Division, December 2006.
- "Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals," Department of Philosophy, UMass Amherst, November 2006.
- "Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals," Department of Philosophy, Brown University, November 2006.
- "Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals," Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, November 2006.
- "Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology?" Department of Philosophy, NYU, April 2006.
- "Replies to Critics," Author-meets-critics symposium on *Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief*, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, March 2006.
- "Some Questions about Gert's Compatibilism," comments on Bernard Gert's paper, Dartmouth-UVM Symposium in Philosophy, June 2005.
- "Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News," Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, October 2004.
- "Am I an Absence?" Comments on Roy Sorensen's paper, Dartmouth-UVM Symposium in Philosophy, June 2004.
- "Three Questions about Leplin's Reliabilism," Greensboro Symposium in Philosophy, March 2004.
- "Against Deductive Cogency," Dartmouth-UVM Symposium in Philosophy, June 2001.
- "Measuring Evidence," Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, April 1999.
- "Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality," Department of Philosophy, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, November 1996.
- "Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality," Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, November 1996.
- "Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality," Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, September 1996.
- "Diachronic Coherence and Epistemic Impartiality," Dartmouth-UVM Symposium in Philosophy, June 1996

“What is Relative Confirmation?” Department of Philosophy, Mount Holyoke College, April 1995.

“The Logic of Dutch Book Arguments: comments on Green,” American Philosophical Association Central Division, May 1994.

“Comments on Foley,” American Philosophical Association Central Division, April 1993.

“Betting Losses and Rationality,” American Philosophical Association Central Division, April 1990.

OTHER MEDIA:

“Epistemology of Disagreement” *Philosophy TV* (with Roy Sorensen), November 2010: <http://www.philostv.com/david-christensen-and-roy-sorensen-2/>.

Interview for Richard Marshall’s *After 3:16 am* series of in-depth interviews with philosophers (July 2020).

Interview for Keiran Setiya’s *Five Questions* podcast of conversations with philosophers (2020).

Interview for “New Books Network” podcast, for contribution to *Philosophy Illustrated* (2022).

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Associate Editor: *Episteme*, 2012 - present

Editorial Board: *Mind*, 2015 – present

Philosophy Compass, 2005 -2020

Editorial Panel: *Thought*, 2012 – present

Steering Committee: Social Epistemology Network, 2017 - present

Program Committee, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division 2013-2015

Referee/Consultant for research funding agencies:

ACLS
Calgary Institute for the Humanities

Danish Council for Independent Research
Estonian Research Council
Guggenheim Foundation
John Templeton Foundation
National Endowment for the Humanities
National Humanities Center
National Science Foundation
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Swiss National Science Foundation

External Review Committee for Philosophy Department:

Amherst College (chair of committee)
Mount Holyoke College
Dartmouth College

Referee for appointment/promotion/tenure/ cases:

[redacted]

Fellowship proposal evaluator:

[redacted]

Book/book proposal evaluator:

Cambridge University Press
Harvard University Press
Mayfield Publishing
MIT Press
Oxford University Press
Polity Press
Princeton University Press

Referee for journals:

Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, dialectica, Dialogue, Episteme, Erkenntnis, European Journal of Philosophy, Inquiry, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Research, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philo, Philosophers' Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy Compass, Philosophy of Science, Res Philosophica, Ratio, Social Philosophy Today, Synthese, Thought, Theoria

Nominating Editor: *Philosophers' Annual* (2009 - 2014)

Evaluator: *Philosophical Gourmet Report* (2004 - 2014)

Program Coordinator: *Episteme* 2009 Conference on Epistemology of Disagreement

Program Committee: Philosophy of Science Association 2006 Biennial meeting

Judge: Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology (2013, 2017)

Nominating group: Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences) (2016, 2017, 2018)

Ph.D. Dissertation Committees at Brown:

Ali Eslami; Katherine Rubin (supervisor); Simon Leen; Andrew Rotondo (supervisor); Philip Galligan; Han Li (supervisor); Brett Topey; Leo Yan; Zachary Barnett (supervisor); Chad Marxen (supervisor); Anna Brinkerhoff (supervisor); Arianna Falbo (supervisor), Orfeas Zormpalas (co-supervisor).

Ph.D. Dissertation Committees outside of Brown:

Active member (reading drafts, advising): Ekaterina Vavova (MIT); Jeffrey Dunn (UMass-Amherst); Miriam Schoenfield (MIT); Robert Steel (University of Pittsburgh); Nicholas Leonard (Northwestern); Justis Koon (UMass-Amherst); Mattias Skipper (Aarhus, Denmark); Amelia Kahn (UTexas-Austin); Brian Wermcrantz (UMass-Amherst).

External dissertation evaluator: Australian National University; Boston University; University of British Columbia; Yale University; Monash University (MA thesis).

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

Inaugural Ernest Sosa Lecture Prize, 2020.

Marc Sanders Lecture Prize, 2018.

University of Vermont Summer Research Grants: 1997, 1993, 1991, 1989.

American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship (for research support during sabbatical) 1994 – 1995.