Rajiv Vohra Ford Foundation Professor of Economics

Rajiv Vohra is a professor of economics and former dean of the faculty at Brown University.

A graduate of St. Stephen's College in New Delhi, Vohra earned his master's at the Delhi School of Economics in 1979 and his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University in 1983. He came to Brown in 1983 as an assistant professor economics, becoming a full professor in 1989. He served as chair of the Department of Economics for four years, from 1991 to 1995.
Vohra's work in economic theory ranges widely, encompassing general equilibrium theory, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, information economics and implementation theory. His theoretical work has served as the conceptual foundation for developing policy in many areas of practical importance, from regulation of public utilities to pollution controls to the formation of cartels. His research has been regularly supported by the National Science Foundation.

Vohra has been a Fulbright Scholar at the Indian Statistical Institute and served as the Morgenstern Visiting Professor of Economic Theory at New York University. He has served on the editorial boards of the International Journal of Game Theory, the Journal of Mathematical Economics and the Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Brown Affiliations

Research Areas

scholarly work

Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games, with Roberto Serrano, Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 117-137 (2007).

A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation, with Roberto Serrano, Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 312-331 (2005).

Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core, with Bhaskar Dutta, Mathematical Social Sciences, 50, 148-165 (2005).

A Simple Model of Coalitional Bidding, with In-Koo Cho and Kevin Jewell, Economic Theory, 19, 435-457 (2002).

Bargaining and Bargaining Sets, with Roberto Serrano, Games and Economic Behavior, 39, 292-308 (2002).

Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, with Roberto Serrano, Investigaciones Economicas, 26, 285-298 (2002).

Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey, with Françoise Forges and Enrico Minelli, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 1-41 (2002).

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects, with Françoise Forges and Jean-François Mertens, Econometrica, 70, 1865-1892 (2002).

Efficiency in an Economy with Fixed Costs, with Andrea Dall'Olio, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3, 185-201 (2001).

Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation, with Roberto Serrano, Econometrica, 69, 785-792 (2001).

On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information, with Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij, Econometrica, 69, 1685-1696 (2001).

Coalitional Power and Public Goods, with Debraj Ray, Journal of Political Economy, 109, 1355-1384 (2001).

Intersecting Balanced Families of Sets, with Adam Idzik and Gyula O.H. Katona, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A, 93, 2, 281-291 (2001).

The Supremum Argument in the New Approach to the Existence of Equilibrium in Vector Lattices, with M. Ali. Khan and Rabee Tourky, Economics Letters, 63, 61-65 (1999).

A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures, with Debraj Ray, Games and Economic Behavior, 26, 286-336 (1999).

Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core, Journal of Economic Theory, 86, 123-147 (1999).

Equilibrium Binding Agreements, with Debraj Ray, Journal of Economic Theory, 73, 30--78 (1997).

Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Core, with Roberto Serrano, Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 513-525, (1997).

Nash Implementation through Elementary Mechanisms in Economic Environments, with Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen, Economic Design, 1, 173-203 (1995). Awarded the Koc Prize for the best paper of the year in Economic Design.

A Characterization of Egalitarian Equivalence, with Bhaskar Dutta, Economic Theory, 3, 465-479 (1993).

Marginal Cost Pricing under Bounded Marginal Returns, Econometrica, 60, 859-876 (1992).

Equity and Efficiency in Non-Convex Economies, Social Choice and Welfare, 9, 185-202 (1992).

On Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, the K-K-M-S Theorem and the Core of a Balanced Game, with Lloyd Shapley, Economic Theory, 1, 107-116 (1991).

An Existence Theorem for a Bargaining Set, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 20, 19-34 (1991).

On the Inefficiency of Two Part Tariffs, Review of Economic Studies, 57, 415-438 (1990).

A Consistent Bargaining Set, with Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray and Kunal Sengupta, Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 93-112 (1989).

On the Existence of Equilibria in Economies with Increasing Returns, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 17, 179-192 (1988).

Optimal Regulation under Fixed Rules for Income Distribution, Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 65-84 (1988).

On the Approximate Decentralization of Pareto Optimal Allocations in Locally Convex Spaces, with M. Ali Khan, Journal of Approximation Theory, 52, 149-161(1988).

Pareto Optimal Allocations of Non-Convex Economies in Locally Convex Spaces, with M. Ali Khan, Journal of Nonlinear Analysis, 12, 943-950 (1988).

On the Existence of Lindahl-Hotelling Equilibria, with M. Ali Khan, Journal of Public Economics, 34, 143-158 (1987).

On Sufficient Conditions for the Sum of Two Weak * Closed Sets to be Weak * Closed, with M. Ali Khan, Archiv der Mathematik, 48, 328-320 (1987).

An Extension of the Second Welfare Theorem to Economies with Non-Convexities and Public Goods, with M. Ali Khan, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 223-241 (1987).

Local Public Goods as Indivisible Commodities", Regional Science and Urban Economics, 17, 191-208 (1987).

A General Theorem on the Existence of Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibrium, with Donald J. Brown, Geoffrey M. Heal and M. Ali Khan, Journal of Economic Theory, 38, 371-379 (1986).

On the Existence of Lindahl Equilibria in Economies with a Measure Space of Non-Transitive Consumers, with M. Ali Khan, Journal of Economic Theory, 36, 319-332 (1985).

Equilibrium in Abstract Economies without Ordered Preferences and with a Measure Space of Agents, with M. Ali Khan, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 13, 133-142 (1984).

Local Public Goods and Average Cost Pricing, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 13, 51-67 (1984).

The Aggregate Production Function of an Industry with Generalized Leontief Cost Functions at the Micro Level, Economics Letters, 8, 227-233 (1981).

research overview

Rajiv Vohra's work in economic theory ranges widely, encompassing general equilibrium theory, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, information economics and implementation theory. His theoretical work has served as the conceptual foundation for developing policy in many areas of practical importance, from regulation of public utilities to pollution controls to the formation of cartels. His research has been regularly supported by the National Science Foundation.

funded research

National Science Foundation Grant, No. SES-0133113, Cooperation and Incentives in Models with Asymmetric Information, 2002-2004.
National Science Foundation Grant, No. SES-9414142, Binding Agreements, 1994-1997.
National Science Foundation Grants, No. SES-8605630 and No. SES-8646400, Theory of Resource Allocation in Nonclassical Environments, 1986-1988.
National Science Foundation Grant, No. SES-8410229, Theory of Resource Allocation with Increasing Returns and Public Goods, 1984-1986.