Bertram F. Malle earned Master’s degrees in philosophy/linguistics (1987) and psychology (1989) at the University of Graz, Austria. After coming to the United States in 1990 he received his Ph.D. at Stanford University in 1995 and joined the University of Oregon Psychology Department. Since 2008 he is Professor at the Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences at Brown University. He received the Society of Experimental Social Psychology Outstanding Dissertation award, a National Science Foundation CAREER award, and he is past president of the Society of Philosophy and Psychology. Malle’s research, which has been funded by DARPA, NSF, Army, Templeton Foundation, and Office of Naval Research, focuses on social cognition, moral judgment, and more recently human-robot interaction. He has published over 120 scientific papers and several books, including: Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (with L. J. Moses and D. A. Baldwin, eds.), MIT Press, 2001; How the Mind Explains Behavior, MIT Press, 2004; and Other minds (with S. D. Hodges, eds.), Guilford Press, 2005.
|Monroe, Andrew E., Malle, Bertram F. Two paths to blame: Intentionality directs moral information processing along two distinct tracks.. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General/Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 2017; 146 (1) : 123-133.|
|Korman, J., Malle, B. F. Grasping for Traits or Reasons? How People Grapple With Puzzling Social Behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin/Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2016; 42 (11) : 1451-1465.|
|TENENBAUM, ELENA J., SOBEL, DAVID M., SHEINKOPF, STEPHEN J., MALLE, BERTRAM F., MORGAN, JAMES L. Attention to the mouth and gaze following in infancy predict language development. Journal of Child Language/Journal of Child Language. 2015; 42 (6) : 1173-1190.|
|Malle, Bertram F. Integrating robot ethics and machine morality: the study and design of moral competence in robots. Ethics and Information Technology/Ethics and Information Technology. 2015; 18 (4) : 243-256.|
|Korman, Joanna, Voiklis, John, Malle, Bertram F. The social life of cognition. Cognition/Cognition. 2015; 135 : 30-35.|
|Scheutz, Matthias, Malle, Bertram F. “Think and do the right thing” — A Plea for morally competent autonomous robots. 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering/2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering. 2014;|
|Malle, Bertram F., Guglielmo, Steve, Monroe, Andrew E. A Theory of Blame. Psychological Inquiry/Psychological Inquiry. 2014; 25 (2) : 147-186.|
|Monroe, Andrew E., Dillon, Kyle D., Malle, Bertram F. Bringing free will down to Earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment. Consciousness and Cognition/Consciousness and cognition. 2014; 27 : 100-108.|
|Malle, Bertram F., Monroe, Andrew E., Guglielmo, Steve Paths to Blame and Paths to Convergence. Psychological Inquiry/Psychological Inquiry. 2014; 25 (2) : 251-260.|
|Roskies, Adina L., Malle, Bertram F. A Strawsonian look at desert. Philosophical Explorations/Philosophical Explorations. 2013; 16 (2) : 133-152.|
|Markowitz, Ezra M., Malle, Bertram F. Did You Just See That? Making Sense of Environmentally Relevant Behavior. Ecopsychology/Ecopsychology. 2012; 4 (1) : 37-50.|
|Tenenbaum, Elena J., Shah, Rajesh J., Sobel, David M., Malle, Bertram F., Morgan, James L. Increased Focus on the Mouth Among Infants in the First Year of Life: A Longitudinal Eye-Tracking Study. Infancy/Infancy. 2012; 18 (4) : 534-553.|
|Malle, Bertram F., Holbrook, Jess Is there a hierarchy of social inferences? The likelihood and speed of inferring intentionality, mind, and personality.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology/Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2012; 102 (4) : 661-684.|
|Monroe, Andrew E., Guglielmo, Steve, Malle, Bertram F. Morality Goes Beyond Mind Perception. Psychological Inquiry/Psychological Inquiry. 2012; 23 (2) : 179-184.|
|Cook, Jonathan E., Calcagno, Justine E., Arrow, Holly, Malle, Bertram F. Friendship trumps ethnicity (but not sexual orientation): Comfort and discomfort in inter-group interactions. British Journal of Social Psychology/British Journal of Social Psychology. 2011; 51 (2) : 273-289.|
|Cook, J. E., Arrow, H., Malle, B. F. The Effect of Feeling Stereotyped on Social Power and Inhibition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin/Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2011; 37 (2) : 165-180.|
|Guglielmo, S., Malle, B. F. Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional? Resolving a Controversy Over Intentionality and Morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin/Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2010; 36 (12) : 1635-1647.|
|Guglielmo, Steve, Malle, Bertram F. Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action. Cognition/Cognition. 2010; 117 (2) : 139-150.|
|Begeer, Sander, Malle, Bertram F., Nieuwland, Mante S., Keysar, Boaz Using Theory of Mind to represent and take part in social interactions: Comparing individuals with high-functioning autism and typically developing controls. European Journal of Developmental Psychology/European Journal of Developmental Psychology. 2010; 7 (1) : 104-122.|
|Dieckmann, Nathan F., Malle, Bertram F., Bodner, Todd E. An empirical assessment of meta-analytic practice.. Review of General Psychology/Review of General Psychology. 2009; 13 (2) : 101-115.|
|Guglielmo, Steve, Monroe, Andrew E., Malle, Bertram F. At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology. Inquiry/Inquiry. 2009; 52 (5) : 449-466.|
|Monroe, Andrew E., Malle, Bertram F. From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology/Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 2009; 1 (2) : 211-224.|
|Malle, Bertram F. Fritz Heider’s Legacy. Social Psychology/Social Psychology. 2008; 39 (3) : 163-173.|
|DePrince, A. P., Freyd, J. J., Malle, B. F. A Replication by Another Name: A Response to Devilly et al. (2007). Psychological Science/Psychological Science. 2007; 18 (3) : 218-219.|
|Malle, Bertram F., Knobe, Joshua M., Nelson, Sarah E. Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology/Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2007; 93 (4) : 491-514.|
|Malle, Bertram, Guglielmo, Steven Directions and Challenges in Studying Folk Concepts and Folk Judgments. Journal of Cognition and Culture/Journal of Cognition and Culture. 2006; 6 (1) : 321-329.|
|Malle, Bertram Intentionality, Morality, and Their Relationship in Human Judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture/Journal of Cognition and Culture. 2006; 6 (1) : 87-112.|
|Malle, Bertram F. The actor-observer asymmetry in attribution: A (surprising) meta-analysis.. Psychological Bulletin/Psychological Bulletin. 2006; 132 (6) : 895-919.|
|Bruininks, Patricia, Malle, Bertram F. Distinguishing Hope from Optimism and Related Affective States. Motivation and Emotion/Motivation and Emotion. 2005; 29 (4) : 324-352.|
Professor Malle's research examines the cognitive tools that humans bring to social interaction (often called "social cognition"), especially the capacity to recognize intentional actions, make inferences about other people's mental states, and explain people's behavior. A strong focus is also on how those cognitive tools figure in moral judgments, emotions, and behaviors, such blame, praise, and guilt. Increasingly, he applies theories and experimental methods to the questions of human-robot interaction and the appropriate design of robots that are adapted to human psychology.
I consider myself a social cognitive scientist — an identity that has been shaped by all three traditional aspects of my academic career. As a researcher, my interests have revolved around the fundamental cognitive tools that allow humans to navigate the social world, a theme that compellingly merges the cognitive with the social. As a teacher I have had the opportunity to teach courses at that same intersection of fields, such as Social Psychology and Cognitive Science. Finally, my previous administrative activity has focused on the Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences at the University of Oregon, an interdisciplinary forum for researchers who share an interest in exploring the mind within its social context. I am currently president-elect of the Society of Philosophy and Psychology, which has a long tradition of studying the mind from multiple disciplinary perspectives.
Social cognitive science is the most suitable category to subsume all of these activities, and it expresses my strong commitment to study the human mind as both a cognitive and a social phenomenon. Below I describe briefly my three central research topics: Social cognition of mental states; intentionality and moral judgment; and explanations of behavior.
Social Cognition of Mental States
In making sense of human behavior, people connect the observed with the unobservedthey find meaning in behavior by inferring mental states. This ability is essential for succeeding in the social world: Without mental state inferences, observed behaviors turn blurry and indistinct, future behaviors are difficult to predict, and communicating with others becomes utterly perplexing.
My research on people' capacity to infer mental states pursues two paths. One examines the conceptual framework that underlies this capacity (people's "theory of mind"), and I have written about its evolutionary, developmental, linguistic, and cultural dimensions (Malle, 2002a, 2002c, 2004, 2005a, 2008b). Many psychological processes rely on this conceptual framework (Malle & Hodges, 2005), and in my second path I examine the perhaps most central of these processes: people's inferences of others' mental states (Malle & Pearce, 2001; Malle, 2005e; Malle & Holbrook, 2012). Each time people encounter a behavior, they make many inferences simultaneously — e.g., about goals, beliefs, emotions — and the question arises both how these inferences relate to each other and how they relate to other judgments, such as about age, gender, and personality. In a series of experiments funded by the National Science Foundation, Jess Holbrook and I tested a possible hierarchy among these inferences. Our studies suggest such a hierarchy ranging from the simplest judgments of a behavior's intentionality and the actor's goal to more complex and difficult judgments about the actor's thoughts and personality characteristics (Malle & Holbrook, 2012).
In ongoing work, Xuan Zhao and I explore whether visual perspective taking (the inference of another person's visual point of view and experience) is a social-cognitive process so basic that it occurs automatically in the presence of another agent.
Intentionality, Moral Judgment, and Free Will
My earlier work on intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997, 2001; Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001) examined the folk concept of intentionality that people bring to social cognitionthe specific conditions that have to be met in order for a behavior to be considered intentional. In an extension into the legal realm, my former Ph.D. student Sarah Nelson and I compared people's folk concept of intentionality to the legal definitions of the terms intent and intentionality and found several contradictions between the two, which opens significant room for misperceptions, misunderstandings, and flawed judgments in legal proceedings (Malle & Nelson, 2003). Ongoing studies in my lab examine in more detail how people make judgments of intentionality about legal cases, how the results of their reasoning compare to those of the legal system, and how the two may be reconciled.
A second line of research examines empirically how intentionality judgments influence blame and how, conversely, blame might influence intentionality judgments (Malle, 2006c; Guglielmo & Malle, 2010a, 2010b). Steve Guglielmo and I have been examining to what extent people's moral evaluations of a behavior cloud their judgments of intentionality about that behavior. Such a process would present a serious challenge to the legal system if judgments of intentionality, which are normally used to ground and justify judgments of guilt and punishment, are already guided by people's intuitions about guilt and punishment. Our results suggest that previous claims of such a biasing effect (Knobe, 2003) do not hold true once the cases and questions are presented in a clear, unambiguous way — taking into account the way people think about intentionality.
In recent work we have developed a theory of blame that fully integrates basic cognitive processes of causal, counterfactual, intentional, and mental inference (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2012, 2014); John Voiklis, Corey Cusimano, and I are currently examining the linguistic foundations for moral criticism more generally; and Mathias Scheutz (Tufts University) and I have begun to develop a framework of possible moral competence in social robots, supported by a grant from the Office of Naval Research.
A third line of work relates judgments of intentionality to judgments of free will and their role in moral judgments. Though people are accused of holding a variety of metaphysical assumptions about free will (e.g., that it requires a soul, indeterminism, or an uncaused cause), it turns out that their main assumption is that humans can make choices, act intentionally in light of those choices, and are "free" to do so to the extent that nobody else if forcing them (Monroe & Malle, 2012, 2014). And not only are people's ascriptions of free will unrelated to ascriptions of having a "soul" and to being a special cause in the universe, but ascriptions of free will themselves play no unique role in moral judgments (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014). Instead, it is again the framework of choice, intentionality (under minimal constraints) that is critical to ascribing blame to other agents.
Explanations of Behavior
Few theories in social psychology have received as much attention as attribution theory. The theory's assumption that humans actively interpret and explain behavioral and social events has led to many insights in the domains of social influence, self-regulation, relationships, and health. However, after nearly 40 years of research, the dominant version of attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) characterizing explanations as referring to either "person causes" or "situation causes" remains highly underspecified, has surprisingly little empirical support, and does not provide a comprehensive account of what people actually do when they explain behavior.
By studying naturally occurring explanations — that is, by letting people use their own words rather than forcing pre-defined rating scales on them — we have developed a folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanations that specifies people's conceptual assumptions underlying those explanations and generates novel predictions about various explanatory phenomena (Malle, 1999, 2001b, 2004, 2007c, 2011; Malle et al., 2000; O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002). According to this theory, people's explanations of behavior cannot be properly understood when explanations are categorized as "person" or "situation" causes. Rather, behavior explanations must be divided into multiple distinct modes (such as causes, reasons, and causal histories) and, within these modes, into specific types (such as belief vs. desire reasons). These are the distinctions that matter when people construct and perceive explanations.
To illustrate, in a meta-analysis of the well-known actor-observer asymmetry in attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1972), the effect size across 173 published studies was zero (Malle, 2006). Thus, when explanations are couched in terms of traditional attribution theory (referring to either person or situation causes), no difference can be detected between people's explanations, as actors, of their own behavior and, as observers, of other people's behavior. By contrast, when couched in terms of the folk-conceptual theory, strong and reliable differences emerge (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). The fact that these classifications have predictive power — not only for actor-observer asymmetries but also for group-individual comparisons (O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002) and impression management (Malle et al., 2000) suggests that the folk-conceptual theory of explanation captures the breakpoints, or joints, in the human endeavor of explaining behavior.
In ongoing work, Joanna Korman and I have demonstrated that people strongly prefer to use reason explanations even for utterly puzzling actions and that belief reasons, in particular, have the power to reaffirm rationality in agent who performed a puzzling behavior.
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 15, pp. 192-240). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology, 16, 309-324.
Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 79-94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Note: All cited references to my own publications can be found in my Curriculum Vitae.
Rhode Island Commerce Corporation, partnership award with Sproutel, Inc., Evaluating psychosocial support provided by Jerry the Bear for Type 1 diabetes (Project leader Malle), $50,000, May 2017- April 2018.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Foundations of Human–Machine Collaboration: Networks of Social and Moral Norms in Human and Artificial Agents (PI), $413,092, April 2016 – January 2017. (Managed as AFOSR FA9550-16-1-0045).
Office of Naval Research, MURI: Moral competence in computational architectures for robots: Foundations, implementations, and demonstrations (co-PI with M. Scheutz and S. Bringsjord), 2014-2017.
Office of Naval Research, The role of affective phenomena in moral judgment (PI), 2013-2016.
John Templeton Foundation/FSU Research Foundation: Developing a model of the folk concept of free will and its impact on moral judgment (PI), 2011-2013.
National Science Foundation: Is there a hierarchy of social inference? Intentionality, mind, and morality (PI), 2008-2011.
Army/Department of Defense STTR Subcontract: Underlying cognitive processes of leadership behavior and development, 2002-2003.
National Science Foundation CAREER (Faculty Early Career Development): The Folk theory of behavior: Implications for social perception and Interaction (PI), 1997-2001.
National Science Foundation Instrumentation Grant (with co-PI John Orbell): Wireless Laboratory for Interpersonal Cognition, 1997.
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014). A theory of blame. Psychological Inquiry, 25, 147-186.
Monroe, A. M., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F. (2014). Bringing free will down to earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment. Consciousness and Cognition, 27, 100-108.
Roskies, A. L., & Malle, B. F. (2013). A Strawsonian look at desert. Philosophical Explorations, 16, 133-152.
Monroe, A. E. , Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2012). Morality goes beyond mind perception. Psychological Inquiry, 23, 179–184.
Markowitz, E. M., & Malle, B. F. (2012). Did you just see that? Making sense of environmentally relevant behavior. Ecopsychology, 4, 37-50.
Malle, B. F., & Holbrook, J. (2012). Is there a hierarchy of social inferences? The likelihood and speed of inferring intentionality, mind, and personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 661–684.
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2012). Moral, cognitive, and social: The nature of blame. In J. Forgas, K. Fiedler, and C. Sedikides (Eds.), Social thinking and interpersonal behavior (pp. 313-331). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Malle, B. F., & Guglielmo, S. (2011). Are intentionality judgments fundamentally moral? In C. Mackenzie and R. Langdon (Eds.), Emotion, imagination, and moral reasoning (Macquarie monographs in cognitive science) (pp. 275-293). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Malle, B. F. (2011b). Time to give up the dogmas of attribution: An alternative theory of behavior explanation. In J. M. Olson and M. P. Zanna, Advances of Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 44, pp. 297-352). Burlington: Academic Press.
Malle, B. F. (2011a). Attribution theories: How people make sense of behavior. In Chadee, D. (Ed.), Theories in social psychology (pp. 72-95). Wiley-Blackwell.
Malle, B. F. (2010). The social and moral cognition of group agents. Journal of Law and Policy, 20, 95-136.
Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2010b). Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action. Cognition, 117, 139-150.
Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2010a). Can unintended side--effects be intentional? Resolving a controversy over intentionality and morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1635-1647.
Begeer, S., Malle, B. F., Nieuwland, M., & Keysar, B. (2010). Using theory of mind to represent and take part in social interactions: Comparing individuals with high-functioning autism and typically developing controls. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 7, 104-122.
Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate about, people's folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 211-224.
Malle, B. F., & Holbrook, J. S. (2009). Theory of mind and consciousness. In A. Cleeremans, P. Wilken, and T. Bayne, Oxford Companion to Consciousness (pp. 630-632). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Guglielmo, S., Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2009). At the heart of morality lies folk psychology. Inquiry, 52, 449-466.
Dieckmann, N. F., Malle, B. F., & Bodner, T. E. (2009). An empirical assessment of meta-analytic practice. Review of General Psychology, 13, 101-115.
Malle, B. F. (2008b). The fundamental tools, and possibly universals, of social cognition. In R. Sorrentino and S. Yamaguchi (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition across cultures (pp. 267-296). New York: Elsevier/Academic Press.
Malle, B. F. (2008a). Fritz Heider's legacy: Celebrated insights, many of them misunderstood. Social Psychology, 39, 163–173.
Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., & Nelson, S. (2007). Actor-observer asymmetries in behavior explanations: New answers to an old question. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 491–514.
Malle, B. F. (2007). Attributions as behavior explanations: Toward a new theory. In D. Chadee and J. Hunter (Eds.), Current themes and perspectives in social psychology (pp. 3-26). St. Augustine, Trinidad: SOCS, The University of the West Indies.
Malle, B. F. (2006a). Intentionality, morality, and their relationship in human judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 87-112.
Malle, B. F. (2006b). Of windmills and strawmen: Folk assumptions of mind and action. In S. Pockett, W. P. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does consciousness cause behavior? An investigation of the nature of volition (pp. 207-231). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Malle, B. F. (2006c). The actor-observer asymmetry in causal attribution: A (surprising) meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 895-919.
Malle, B. F., Tate, C. (2006). Explaining the past, predicting the future. In L. J. Sanna & E. Chang (Eds.), Judgments over time: The interplay of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (pp. 182-209). New York: Oxford University Press.
Malle, B. F., & Hodges, S. D. (Eds.). (2005). Other minds: How humans bridge the divide between self and other. New York: Guilford Press.
Malle, B. F. (2005). Folk theory of mind: Conceptual foundations of human social cognition. In R. Hassin, J. S. Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The new unconscious (pp. 225-255). New York: Oxford University Press.
Bruininks, P., & Malle, B. F. (2005). Positive affect toward the future: Distinguishing hope from optimism and related affective states. Motivation and Emotion, 29, 327-355.
Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Malle, B. F., & Nelson, S. E. (2003). Judging mens rea: The tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 21, 563-580.
Malle, B. F. (2002). Verbs of interpersonal causality and the folk theory of mind and behavior. In M. Shibatani (Ed.), The grammar of causation and interpersonal manipulation (pp. 57-83). Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Givón, T., & Malle, B. F. (Eds.). (2002). The evolution of language out of pre-language. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
O'Laughlin, M. J., & Malle, B. F. (2002). How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 33-48.
Malle, B. F., & Pearce, G. E. (2001). Attention to behavioral events during social interaction: Two actor-observer gaps and three attempts to close them. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 278-294.
Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Paperback 2003)
Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., O'Laughlin, M., Pearce, G. E., & Nelson, S. E. (2000). Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: Beyond person–situation attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 309-326.
Malle, B. F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 23-48.
Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997a). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 101-121.
Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997b). Which behaviors do people explain? A basic actor-observer asymmetry. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 288-304.
Malle, B. F., & Horowitz, L. M. (1995). The puzzle of negative self-views: An explanation using the schema concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 470-484.
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable relating to social roles and intergroup relations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763.
Horowitz, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1993). Fuzzy concepts in psychotherapy research. Psychotherapy Research, 3, 131-148.
|1989||MS||University of Graz|
|1987||MA||University of Graz|
Fellow (2013-), Association of Psychological Science (APS)
President, Society of Philosophy and Psychology, 2009-2010
Posner/Boies Fellowship 2004, University of Oregon
NSF CAREER Award (1997-2001)
Outstanding Dissertation Award 1995, Society of Experimental Social Psychology (SESP)
|Littman, Michael||Professor of Computer Science|
|Morgan, James||Professor of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences|
|Sobel, David||Professor of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences|
Association for Computing and Machinery, ACM (Member)
Association of Psychological Science, APS (Fellow)
Cognitive Science Society (Member)
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, IEEE (Member),
TechEthics™ Community (Member)
International Association for Computation and Philosophy, IACAP (Life-time member)
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, SPSP
Society of Experimental Social Psychology, SESP (Fellow)
Society of Philosophy and Psychology, SPP (Past president, life-time member)
Psi Chi National Honors Society (Member)
Psychonomic Society (Member)
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, SPSP (Member)
Society of Experimental Social Psychology, SESP (Fellow)
Society of Philosophy and Psychology, SPP (Life-time member)
Courses taught at Brown since 2009:
Social Cognitive Science
Courses taught at the University of Oregon between 1995 and 2008:
Judgment and Decision Making
Psychology and the Social World
Self and Others
Social Cognitive Science
|CLPS 0700 - Social Psychology|
|CLPS 2908 - Multivariate Statistical Techniques|