Professor Arpaly's work focuses on ethics, moral psychology, action theory, free will, and normative ethics.

My interest is in the complexity of moral psychology. I first started writing in moral psychology when I was struck by the ubiquity of inconsistence between people's moral principles and their actions and emotions. Not only are there (notoriously) people who fail to practice the good things they preach,  but there are also wonderful people who preach bad things. Observations like that lead me to curiousity as to questions about what it is that makes people good or bad (virtue) and what makes them praiseworthy or blameworthy for their actions (moral worth). Also of interest to me is the question of rationality - what makes a person rational in his or her thoughts and actions. In a related vein, I have worked on some aspects of the problem of free will - basically, the compatibility of determinism and moral praise and blame as well as with meanigfull lives in general, and also, in forthcoming work,  the role of moral ignorance (i.e how one can, or cannot, blame a Nazi who thought he was doing the right thing when he committed murder). 

I have worked extensively with my coauthor,  Timothy Schroeder, who has some background in science, on the nature of desire and role of desire in major part of our moral lives, especially virtue and acting for reasons, with some detailed discussions of subject such love and addiction.  My current projects: a theory of virtue which is based on desire but friendly to the sense of duty and beginning to sketch a theory of normative ethics - neither Kantian nor utilitarian - based on evidence that have to do with moral psychology. 

Books:

In Praise of Desire  Oxford University Press (with Timothy Schroeder). 2014 
Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage –an Essay on Free Will   Princeton University Press, 
2006 
Unprincipled Virtue: an Inquiry into Moral Agency  Oxford University Press, 2002  

Articles

"Reply to Critics". Forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

“Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance”.  Forthcoming,  The Nature of Moral Responsibility,  Oxford University Press.
“A Causal Theory of Acting for Reasons” (with Timothy Schroeder) . Forthcoming, American Philosophical Quarterly

“Addiction and Blameworthiness” (with Timothy Schroeder)  in Levy, Neil Addiction and Self Control, Oxford University Press 2013

“Deliberation and Acting for Reasons”  (With Timothy Schroeder) Philosophical Review 121:2 109-139 (2012)

“Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue” American Philosophical Quarterly 48:1 2011
  Commentary on Susan Wolf’s “Meaning in Life and Why it Matters”, in Meaning in Life and Why It matters,  Princeton University Press 2010
“ Review: Reply to Harman, Stroud, and Mason” (in a symposium on my book Unprincipled Virtue) Philosophical Studies 134 (3)  457-465 2007
 “Reply to Pippin” Philosophical Explorations 10 (3) 303-307 2007
How it is not "Just Like Diabetes": Mental Disorders and the Moral Psychologist1. Philosophical Issues 15 (1), 282-298 2005
Which Autonomy”, in Campbell, O’Rourke and Shier , Freedom and Determinism, 
 MIT press 2004
Complex Theories of Autonomy, in Taylor, James, Personal Autonomy, Cambridge University Press 2004
“Moral Worth”,  Journal of Philosophy 99,  May 2002, 223-245  (also chosen for Philosopher’s Annual, 2003 as one of the best 10 philosophy papers of 2002)
 “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Best Judgment”. Ethics 110/2 April 2000 488-513
“Hamlet and the Utilitarians” Philosophical Studies 99 45-57 2000,  
"Alienation and Externality "(with Timothy Schroeder) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29/3 September 1999 371-388
"Praise, Blame, and the Whole Self" (with Timothy Schroeder) – Philosophical Studies,   

Book Reviews
Richard Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013
Chrisoula Andrews and Mark White, The Thief of Time Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011
Christine Korsgaard,  The Constitution of Agency Philosophical Review 120 (4) 607-609 2011
Lee Overton and Sarah Buss, Contours of Agency, Mind, 2006
Edna Ulman-Margalit, Reasoning Practically, Ethics 112 2002
Ruth Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, Mind 109 
864-866 2000

Fellow, Center of Ethics and the Profession at Harvard University (2001-02)

The paper "Moral Worth" was included in Philosopher's Anuual as one of the best 10 papers of 2002.