David Christensen's research has mainly been in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Some of the questions he has written on are: What determines whether a given bit of evidence supports or refutes a given theory? What logical principles apply to rational beliefs (either degrees of belief either all-or-nothing beliefs)? How should one's beliefs be affected by one's knowing that other people--equally informed, rational and intelligent people--believe differently? He is currently working on questions about how our theory of ideal rationality should accommodate rational self-doubt, and, in general, what constraints rationality puts on the way one regards one's own beliefs. He received his B.A. from Hampshire College and his Ph.D. from UCLA. He taught for 20 years at the University of Vermont before coming to Brown in 2007.
|Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia. Episteme. 2016;|
|Christensen, David Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity. Nous. 2014; : n/a-n/a.|
|Disagreement and Public Controversy. Essays in Collective Epistemology. 2014;|
|Epistemic Modesty Defended. Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. 2013; : 77-97.|
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.
|Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism. Philosophers' Imprint. 2011; : 1-22.|
|CHRISTENSEN, DAVID Higher-Order Evidence1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2010; 81 (1) : 185-215.|
|Christensen, David RATIONAL REFLECTION1. Philosophical Perspectives. 2010; 24 (1) : 121-140.|
|Christensen, David Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass. 2009; 4 (5) : 756-767.|
Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals.
Oxford Studies in Epistemology. 2007; 2 : 3-31.
|Christensen, D. Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review. 2007; 116 (2) : 187-217.|
|Christensen, David XIII-Epistemic Self-Respect. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). 2007; 107 (1pt3) : 319-337.|
|Christensen, David Three questions about Leplin’s reliabilism. Philos Stud. 2006; 134 (1) : 43-50.|
Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief,.
|Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science. 2001; 68 : 356-376.|
|Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality. Philosophical Review. 2000; 109 : 349-371.|
|Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy. 1999; 96 : 437 461.|
|David Christensen, Hilary Kornblith Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori. Philosophical Studies. 1997; 86 (1-20)|
|What is Relative Confirmation?. Nous. 1997; 31 : 370 - 385.|
|Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. Journal of Philosophy. 1996; 93 : 450 - 479.|
|Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality. Nous. 1995; 29 : 259 - 274.|
|Conservatism in Epistemology. Nous. 1994; 28 : 69 - 89.|
|Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1993; 53 : 301 - 321.|
|Switched-Words Skepticism: a Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument. Philosophical Studies. 1993; 71 : 33 - 58.|
|Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections. Analysis. 1992; 52 : 163-168.|
|Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology. Philosophy of Science. 1992; 59 : 540-557.|
|Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs. Philosophical Review. 1991; 100 : 229-247.|
|The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science. 1990; 57 : 644-662.|
|Glymour on Evidential Relevance. Philosophy of Science. 1983; 50 : 471-481.|
|PHIL 0010 - The Place of Persons|
|PHIL 0990V - Current Questions About Rational Belief|
|PHIL 1590 - Philosophy of Science|
|PHIL 1750 - Epistemology|
|PHIL 2050G - Higher-Order Evidence|
|PHIL 2800 - Dissertation Workshop|