|
Christensen, David.
"Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required." Noûs, 2022.
|
|
"Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty." Philosophical Studies, vol. 178, 2021, pp. 2191–2214.
|
|
"Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas." K. McCain, S. Stapleford, and M. Steup, eds., Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2021.
|
|
"Rationality for the Self-Aware (Ernest Sosa Prize Lecture)." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 95, 2021, pp. 191–212.
|
|
"The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 103, no. 3, 2021, pp. 501-517.
|
|
"Formulating Independence." Skipper, M. and A. Steglich-Petersen, eds., Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays (Oxford University Press, 2019.
|
|
David Christensen.
"On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case,” Marc Sanders Lecture." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, no. 92, 2018, pp. 207-235.
|
|
"Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia." Episteme, 2016.
|
|
Christensen, David.
"Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity." Nous, 2014, pp. n/a-n/a.
|
|
"Disagreement and Public Controversy." Essays in Collective Epistemology, 2014.
|
|
"Epistemic Modesty Defended." Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, 2013, pp. 77-97.
|
|
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. edited by David Christensen, Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press, 2013.
|
|
"Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism." Philosophers' Imprint, 2011, pp. 1-22.
|
|
CHRISTENSEN, DAVID.
"Higher-Order Evidence1." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 81, no. 1, 2010, pp. 185-215.
|
|
Christensen, David.
"RATIONAL REFLECTION1." Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 24, no. 1, 2010, pp. 121-140.
|
|
Christensen, David.
"Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy." Philosophy Compass, vol. 4, no. 5, 2009, pp. 756-767.
|
|
"Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals." Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 2, 2007, pp. 3-31.
|
|
Christensen, D.
"Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review, vol. 116, no. 2, 2007, pp. 187-217.
|
|
Christensen, David.
"XIII-Epistemic Self-Respect." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), vol. 107, no. 1pt3, 2007, pp. 319-337.
|
|
Christensen, David.
"Three questions about Leplin’s reliabilism." Philos Stud, vol. 134, no. 1, 2006, pp. 43-50.
|
|
David Christensen.
Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief,. Oxford University Press, 2004.
|
|
"Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism." Philosophy of Science, vol. 68, 2001, pp. 356-376.
|
|
"Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality." Philosophical Review, vol. 109, 2000, pp. 349-371.
|
|
"Measuring Confirmation." Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, 1999, pp. 437 461.
|
|
David Christensen, Hilary Kornblith.
"Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori." Philosophical Studies, vol. 86, no. 1-20, 1997.
|
|
"What is Relative Confirmation?." Nous, vol. 31, 1997, pp. 370 - 385.
|
|
"Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers." Journal of Philosophy, vol. 93, 1996, pp. 450 - 479.
|
|
"Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality." Nous, vol. 29, 1995, pp. 259 - 274.
|
|
"Conservatism in Epistemology." Nous, vol. 28, 1994, pp. 69 - 89.
|
|
"Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 53, 1993, pp. 301 - 321.
|
|
"Switched-Words Skepticism: a Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument." Philosophical Studies, vol. 71, 1993, pp. 33 - 58.
|
|
"Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections." Analysis, vol. 52, 1992, pp. 163-168.
|
|
"Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology." Philosophy of Science, vol. 59, 1992, pp. 540-557.
|
|
"Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs." Philosophical Review, vol. 100, 1991, pp. 229-247.
|
|
"The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping." Philosophy of Science, vol. 57, 1990, pp. 644-662.
|
|
"Glymour on Evidential Relevance." Philosophy of Science, vol. 50, 1983, pp. 471-481.
|
