Pedro Dal Bó, Associate Professor of Economics, received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2002. He works in the areas of game theory, experimental economics, and political economy. Recent work has examined the relationship between violence, corruption, and the quality of politicians; the effect of economic shocks and policies on social conflict; the determinants of cooperation in repeated games; and the effect of democracy and moral suasion on pro-social behavior.
|Dal Bó, Pedro, Fréchette, Guillaume R. On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature/Journal of Economic Literature. 2018; 56 (1) : 60-114.|
|Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro, Eyster, Erik The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects. The Review of Economic Studies/Review of Economic Studies. 2017; 85 (2) : 964-998.|
|Dal Bó, Pedro Experimental Evidence on the Workings of Democratic Institutions. Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth/Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth. 2014; : 266-288.|
|Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro “Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation. Journal of Public Economics. 2014; 117 : 28-38.|
|Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro Conflict and Policy in General Equilibrium: Insights from a Standard Trade Model. Oxford Handbooks Online/Oxford Handbooks Online. 2012;|
|Dal Bó, Pedro, Fréchette, Guillaume R The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence. American Economic Review. 2011; 101 (1) : 411-429.|
|Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro WORKERS, WARRIORS, AND CRIMINALS: SOCIAL CONFLICT IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2011; 9 (4) : 646-677.|
|Bó, Pedro Dal, Foster, Andrew, Putterman, Louis Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy. American Economic Review. 2010; 100 (5) : 2205-2229.|
|Aizer, Anna, Dal Bó, Pedro Love, hate and murder: Commitment devices in violent relationships. Journal of Public Economics. 2009; 93 (3-4) : 412-428.|
|DAL BÓ, ERNESTO, DAL BÓ, PEDRO, SNYDER, JASON Political Dynasties. Review of Economic Studies. 2009; 76 (1) : 115-142.|
|Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro, Di Tella, Rafael Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2007; 16 (3) : 577-598.|
|Bó, Pedro Dal Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2007; 38 (2) : 533-540.|
|DAL BÓ, ERNESTO, DAL BÓ, PEDRO, DI TELLA, RAFAEL “Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence. American Political Science Review. 2006; 100 (01)|
|Bó, Pedro Dal Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. American Economic Review. 2005; 95 (5) : 1591-1604.|
|Bó, Pedro Dal Social norms, cooperation and inequality. Economic Theory. 2005; 30 (1) : 89-105.|
Pedro Dal Bó works in the areas of game theory, experimental economics, and political economy. Recent work has examined the relationship between violence, corruption, and the quality of politicians; political dynasties; the effect of economic shocks and policies on social conflict; the determinants of cooperation in repeated games; and the effect of democracy and moral suasion on pro-social behavior. He is currently working on equilibrium selection in repeated games, strategy choice in repeated games, and democratic decision making.
"Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium," with Ernesto Dal Bó, Journal of the European Economic Association, August 2011.
"The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence" with Guillaume Fréchette, American Economic Review, February 2011.
"Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy" with Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman, American Economic Review, December 2010.
"Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships," with Anna Aizer, Journal of Public Economics, April 2009.
"Political Dynasties," with Ernesto Dal Bó and Jason Snyder, Review of Economic Studies, January 2009.
"Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations," RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2007.
"Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality," Economic Theory, January 2007.
"Plata o Plomo?: Bribes and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence," with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, American Political Science Review, February 2006.
"Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games," American Economic Review, December 2005.
|2002||PhD||University of California, Los Angeles|
|2000||MA||University of California, Los Angeles|
|1996||MA||Universidad Torcuato di Tella|
|1994||BA||Universidad de Buenos Aires|
|Aizer, Anna||Professor of Economics, Chair of Economics|
|Foster, Andrew||George S. and Nancy B. Parker Professor of Economics, Director of Social Science Research Institute|
|Putterman, Louis||Professor of Economics|
Faculty Research Associate NBER.
Intermediate Microeconomics focuses on the fundamental tools that economists use to explain a variety of social phenomena. The course covers the following topics: what economics is about, consumer theory, exchange economies, production theory, partial equilibrium, general equilibrium with production, externalities, monopoly, game theory, uncertainty and asymmetric information.
Bargaining Theory: The first part of the course focuses on the general study of economic behavior in situations of strategic interaction (know as Game Theory). The second part of the course cover the strategic and axiomatic theories of bargaining, their connections and their application to the study of economic institutions and social phenomena. We use class experiments to motivate and test the theories we study.
|ECON 1110 - Intermediate Microeconomics|
|ECON 1570 - The Economics of Latin Americans|
|ECON 2010 - Mathematics for Economists|
|ECON 2270 - Political Economy II|
|ECON 2970 - Workshop in Economic Theory|